by Dai Qing
Editors'
Note |
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Chapter 25
CHAPTER TWENTY-SIX MUST A FINISHED PROJECT FINISH ITS ENVIRONMENT?248 by Mao Yushi249 Since 1979, when I began
to pay attention to the Chinese strategy of capital construction, I have noticed
many serious problems in the decision-making process. For example, the pipes
for natural gas were laid before the resources had been explored; coal was transported
from the north to the south of China but the boilers that originally used coal
for fuel had been changed to burn oil, and so had to be reconverted in response
to the oil shortage. Such changes caused great
losses. Personally, I believe that under the present system, it is very difficult
to make good decisions. Having taken part in the decision-making process, I
have discovered that decisions reflect the political hierarchy. Since 1949, national investment
in capital construction has always been overextended despite very ineffective
results. One reason is that decision makers are spending the state's funds rather
than their own, and, as a result, issues of economic efficiency and profit are
being neglected. To those who support the immediate start of the Three Gorges
project, I will ask only one question: "Are you willing to support the
20-year project by personally investing in construction bonds?" Here, the
essential issue is that of investment systems, which need changing. In the old days, when my
uncle, Mao Yishen, designed the Qiantan River bridge, the director of the construction
office in Zhejing province told him he would take care of the budget, and that
my uncle was to be in charge of personnel. But one point was made clear: if
the bridge turned out to be a failure then they both had to take responsibility
and jump in the river. Today, however, after many failed and defective projects,
people no longer feel personally responsible. It is ridiculous to make a final
decision on the extraordinarily large Three Gorges project without an established
decision-making process and a practical investment system. Although there were several
hundred experts and specialists at the assessment meeting, their responsibilities
were not well defined. It is dangerous to make a final decision by relying on
an assessment for which no one is responsible! Finally, I would like to draw
your attention to another problem that has apparently not been mentioned by
either side's assessment: the life span of the reservoir. We all know that the Aswan
dam brought many problems to Egypt.250 What will happen to the Three
Gorges reservoir after it is operational? At present, it seems that plans for
nuclear power plants are not very promising, because after they are no longer
in use, the land on which the plants are located is unusable. At the moment
the Three Gorges' scenic beauty seems much less important than its hydro-electric
potential. However, in a few decades, when several hundred million kWh of electricity
will be very easy to produce, or to replace by other energy resources, won't
we regret the irreplaceable loss of the scenic Gorges? Another point I want to
make relates to the problem of terrorism. Perhaps it is not a threat in today's
China. But what about the future? If terrorists choose the Three Gorges reservoir
as their target, what costs might it inflict? The government would deplore its
predecessor, which spent such large sums to create a project that could so easily
become the target of terrorists.
Sources and Further Commentary 248This essay was included in the original Chinese edition of Yangtze! Yangtze! 249Mao Yushi is a researcher at the American Studies Center of the Research Institute in Social Sciences, and is the past editor-in-chief of the Journal of the Chinese Economy. 250Problems included increases in the water table, in salinity and water logging, in erosion of the riverbed of the Nile, and in rats and scorpions, and in decreased fish stocks
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